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On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
was murdered by a Bosnian Serb revolutionary named Gavrilo Princep. Five weeks later the Great 
Powers of Europe embarked on a war whose consequences were only dimly foreseen by those who 
chose to wage it. The First World War dissolved the three great empires that had maintained social and 
political order throughout a vast region extending from the Rhine to the Urals and the Euphrates. It made 
possible the triumph of Communism in Russia, and the rise of Fascism and National Socialism throughout 
much of Central and Eastern Europe. It encouraged a new spirit of self-assertion and resistance among 
colonized peoples on the peripheries of the world system, and marked the first appearance of the United 
States at the center of international politics. It killed ten million people, and maimed twenty million more. 
The diplomatic and strategic failures of July, 1914, from which these seminal developments arose, are the 
subject of an enormous literature. The comments that follow are intended to address only one aspect of a 
complex picture, albeit a central one: the relative sympathy that the idea of preventive war had come to 
command in Germany before 1914, and its impact on German conduct during the final crisis that led to 
the war. The concept of "preventive" war has lately become an object of much confusion because of 
recent American policy statements that insist on characterizing military action taken to avert a serious 
future crisis, of greater inherent danger than may exist at present, as "pre-emptive"—a term that has 
heretofore been used to describe measures taken to anticipate an impending attack, and which critics of 
current administration policy have rejected on the grounds that, absent clear evidence of such an attack, 
the claim of pre-emption illegitimately deflects political and moral responsibility for violence from the 
United States to its adversaries. There is no intention here to contribute to this unedifying war of words, 
still less to claim any genealogy of descent between German policy in 1914 and that of the United States 
today. For our purposes preventive war means what it has always meant until a few months ago: war not 
to beat an opponent to the punch, but to forestall some putatively foreseeable but still somewhat remote 
threat or disadvantage. This sort of strategic calculus achieved new prominence among the Great Powers 
in the decades leading up to the crisis of July, 1914, and most decisively so in Germany, whose strategic 
culture had previously been marked more by opportunism than aggression. 
A military strategy is, in the simplest terms, a deliberate course of action in which the use of force is not 
ruled out. The element of deliberation necessarily requires some estimate of what tomorrow may bring, 
and to that extent all strategy rests upon humanity's capacity to anticipate and organize against adversity: 
to detect in a pact of friendship between formerly rival cities, or the arranged marriage of a distant 
princess to a neighboring prince, or the discovery of new lands overseas, or a thousand other contingent 
events, some peril to which a forceful response may be required. In these terms all wars not undertaken 
in a spirit of naked expansionism may be deemed "preventive," and even defended as such for political 
purposes, at least insofar as they are fought to prevent the future from turning out worse than it otherwise 
might. Nevertheless, from the point of view of those responsible for preparing and waging war, it is 
possible to distinguish between wars fought to seize opportunities or avert calamity, and those conducted 
in anticipation of conditions that do not yet exist, but may. The latter require a combination of factors that 
are more typical of modern times than of the more remote past: confidence that the future will be different 
from the present, not just sub specie aeternitatis, but as a consequence of developments whose direction 
can be anticipated, and which unfold at a pace that intersects with the requirements of military planning; 
plus military and political institutions sufficiently agile to act upon such premonitions, once they are 
achieved. The temptations of preventive war rise in the industrial era because the pace of technological 
and social change accelerate to the point where they prey upon the realm of strategy, such that plans and 
arrangements a generation in the making may suddenly have to be discounted at a sickening rate, all 
because they have been overtaken by events. 
Such apprehensions afflicted the soldiers and statesmen of all the Great Powers at the turn of the 
twentieth century, but most consequentially those of Germany, whose reactions to an increasingly fluid 
strategic environment would be marked by deepening frustration and pessimism. Despite the unparalleled 
reputation of its armed forces, the German way of war had not theretofore been marked by any particular 
tendency to anticipate the next turn of history's wheel. The Prussian monarchy, around which the German 
nation state had been assembled, had risen to European prominence in the 1740s when its young king, 
Frederick the Great, had taken advantage of a succession crisis in the Habsburg Empire to lay hold of the 
Austrian province of Silesia, an act of pure piracy no doubt, but one more suggestive of quick reflexes 
than a desire to force the pace. Prussian arms would afterward be cast into the shade by the rise of 
Napoleonic France, from which they emerged in the 1860s through a series of short, violent, opportunistic 
wars—against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870-71)—by which Prussian hegemony in 
Central Europe was affirmed, and the German Empire created. Although the last of these wars might well 
count as a "preventive," the onus of having precipitated it fell firmly upon France, which had sought to 
anticipate and block an emerging peril—the unification of Germany—but lacked the military wherewithal 
to do so. German policy, in contrast, was guided by one of the most accomplished statesmen of any age, 
Otto von Bismarck, a man of blood and iron, as he so famously proclaimed, but nevertheless one whose 
outstanding characteristics were patience and timing. "We can wind our watches," he once observed, "but 
the time will not pass any more quickly, and the ability to wait while a situation develops is one of the 
prerequisites of practical politics." 
This cautious spirit would be lost on Bismarck's successors, who would gradually reinterpret his 
achievements as a warrant to use force, should the Gordian Knot of diplomacy became too densely 
tangled to tease apart. By July of 1914, their sense of being ensnared had been growing for some time. 
The first twist of the rope had come twenty years before, in the conclusion of a defensive alliance 
between France and Russia, two countries that Bismarck had striven to keep apart, but which were finally 
joined together by a variety of shared economic and geopolitical interests, above all a common rivalry 
with Great Britain in the race for empire. Russia in particular harbored no evil designs against Germany, 
though it did against Germany's only important ally, Austria-Hungary, whose influence in Southeastern 
Europe affronted Russia's claim to be the champion of all Slavic peoples. Besides, there was no way to 
guarantee that Russia might not somehow be drawn into a French scheme to avenge its defeat in 1871; 
nor, more realistically, that France would not seek to exploit a limited conflict in Eastern Europe to regain 
its lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, secure in the knowledge that Germany's response would be 
limited by the need to take precautions elsewhere. German strategy was thus fixated upon the 
possibilities of simultaneous conflict on its eastern and western frontiers. In response its General Staff 
would devise perhaps the boldest strategic conception of modern times, the so-called Schlieffen Plan, by 
which the French army was to be enveloped and defeated before that of Russia could be brought into 
play. 
The Schlieffen Plan, it must be emphasized, was not a plan for preventive, nor even necessarily for 
aggressive war. It did, however, incorporate a strong pre-emptive element by virtue of its overwhelming 
initial attack against France, a move predicated on the assumption that France would seize any 
opportunity to strike at Germany, once German forces were tied down elsewhere. This attack in turn was 
critically dependent on the speed with which Russian forces could be brought to bear against Germany's 
exposed eastern provinces, which were to be left virtually undefended in order to mass all available 
forces in the west. Russian military inefficiency would create the window of opportunity during which the 
decisive stroke in the west could be delivered. The more quickly Russian forces could be mobilized for 
war, however, the less time would be available to defeat France. It is from this operational calculus that 
the German disposition to preventive war would arise. By the time the July crisis broke upon Europe, 
German planners were increasingly persuaded that, because of the speed with which Russia's armed 
forces were improving themselves, the window on which they had been counting was about to slam shut. 
Signs of strain were already evident during the First Balkan War (1911-12). Although Bismarck had 
declared that the Balkans were "not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier," the region had been a 
focus of concern even in his day because of the prospect that trouble there could lead to war between 
Austria and Russia, whose client, Serbia, was a thorn in the Austrian side. In all of the many crises that 
had erupted in the Balkans since the 1870s, Germany had adopted a consistent policy of restraining its 
Austrian ally, while cautioning Russia of the dangers of adopting an excessively confrontational line. Now, 
however, patience was wearing thin. Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, had become 
convinced, as he said, that "war is inevitable, and the sooner the better." This observation was made at a 
high-level meeting in December of 1912, and inspired widespread assent, but only limited action, since it 
was felt that the time was not yet right. Even in 1914, Moltke calculated that it would be "two or three 
years" before Russia's national railway network—the critical missing link in its military infrastructure—
would be sufficiently developed to thwart Germany's plans. It would in any case be necessary, as the 
Emperor emphasized, to prepare public opinion, so that people would become "accustomed to the idea of 
such a war beforehand." A few months later, Moltke explained to his Austrian counterpart, Conrad von 
Hoetzendorf, that Austria should refrain for the moment from provoking a show-down with Serbia, 
because in present circumstances it would be difficult for Germany to "find an effective slogan" for a major 
war. 
This last problem was solved in decisive fashion by Princep's bullet. By then, the idea of preventive war 
arising from Russian intervention in the Balkans had become commonplace in German military circles. 
Less so among German diplomats, however, whose initial reaction to Francis-Ferdinand's murder was 
once again, as Germany's ambassador to Vienna reported, to "take every opportunity … to advise quietly 
but very impressively and seriously against too hasty steps." One need only consider the Emperor's 
marginal notation to this well-meaning but misguided dispatch to see what had changed: "Now or never! 
Who authorized him to act this way? That is very stupid! … Let [the ambassador] drop this nonsense! The 
Serbs must be disposed of, and that right soon!" 
Far from urging caution and restraint, Germany would now push its Austrian ally toward swift and decisive 
confrontation, offering a "blank check" guarantee of military support should Russia come to the aid of 
Serbia, as it was certain to do. German war plans in turn ensured that any conflict with Russia must begin 
with an attack against France, a scheme driven by military calculations that were entirely independent of 
whatever political attitude the French might adopt. Afterwards, the victors at Versailles would declare that 
the Great War had begun as a consequence of aggression by the Central Powers, a judgment that has 
survived scholarly scrutiny better than most such triumphant pronouncements; though if it is taken to 
mean that Germany willed the First World War, and actively planned or sought to bring it about, it is 
obviously absurd. Germany did not wish for the Great War any more than any of the other belligerents did. 
But Germany did wish to force a local confrontation in the Balkans that it could use to break the Franco-
Russian alliance, and for that purpose it was willing to risk war on a continental scale, a risk that could be 
averted only by Russian concessions of a kind that no one in Berlin seriously imagined would be 
forthcoming. Among the Great Powers, Germany was the one best situated to forestall the escalation of a 
regional crisis into a continental catastrophe. It had in fact done so in the past, and it did not do so now 
because its most senior military and civilian leadership had become convinced that violent confrontation 
was inevitable, in which case German interests dictated that it be sought sooner rather than later, before 
the modernization of Russia's armed forces rendered Germany's long-matured strategy for a two-front 
war infeasible. 
What, then, was Germany trying to "prevent" by going to war in the summer of 1914? Not war itself, 
obviously, for that was the policy of choice. Nor was it seeking to avert defeat by striking first. No one in 
Europe sought war with Germany in 1914, a fact that was perfectly apparent in Berlin. Germany was at 
least arguably seeking to prevent the humiliation of its Austrian ally by Russia and Serbia; though 
humiliation is an awfully strong word under the circumstances. Even the Russians accepted that Serbia 
was complicit in terrorism, and agreed to the far-reaching concessions Belgrade had offered by way of 
recompense for the Archduke's murder. In any case, few countries are willing to risk their national 
existence to spare an ally hurt feelings, particularly one that, as Germany's leadership fully realized, was 
scarcely able to function any longer as a Great Power. 
In the end, however, the stakes for Germany were less about war and peace than about freedom and 
autonomy. By 1914, Germany's soldiers in particular had become convinced that, unless they took the 
bull by the horns soon, they would lose their future freedom of action. Preventive war, after all, is by 
definition about the future, and what cast a pall over the future in this case was the conviction that 
Germany would, within a few years, be required to adopt a less assertive and more defensively oriented 
strategic posture, because it would no longer be able to venture on the bold, high-risk offensive 
operations required by the Schlieffen Plan. Germany went to war in 1914 because it did not wish to see 
its military options limited by the continued modernization of a likely adversary, even one that had scant 
prospect of, or interest in, attacking Germany itself. What was inevitable in 1914 was not war, but a 
gradual erosion of German military preponderance on the continent. Or so it seemed. Thus, "Now or 
never"—"never" being a most intimidating choice indeed, though one, it is fair to say, that sometimes 
merits more consideration than it receives. 
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